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terms appear in nearly seventy percent of the wills in our sample, including many estates in which there is no realistic possibility of discord. For example, the clause in the first lines of this Article comes from the will of a deceased Alameda County resident named Louise Chin. 16 One can hardly fault Chin for taking precautions against litigation. Yet Chin also named her son Gordon sole beneficiary and executor. 17 Thus, the only person to whom the no contest provision applied was assuredly not going to challenge the instrument or the management of the estate. At the same time, the provision could have dissuaded Gordon from taking benign steps like asking the court to clarify an ambiguity in the will or to determine whether property belonged to the estate or was held in joint tenancy. 18 Therefore, we conclude that some no contest provisions are intent-thwarting boilerplate.
We then offer evidence that sticky default rules can help combat this problem. In 1994, the California Supreme Court decided Burch v. George, which interpreted a no contest clause expansively. 19 In 2001, the California legislature responded to concerns that testators did not appreciate the capaciousness of no contest clauses under Burch by passing Probate Code section 21305. 20 This statute declares that certain types of lawsuits, such as creditor's claims, and instruments, like codicils, do not trigger contest penalties unless the testator explicitly directs otherwise. 21 This choice architecture makes section 21305 a sticky default: it nudges testators toward accepting a favorable background principle by increasing the cost and effort required to opt out. Indeed, the law incorporates the two most elegant features of sticky defaults. First, because the statute's presumptions are heavy but not mandatory, it influences the meaning of no contest clauses and yet does not erect a bright-line restriction on testamentary freedom. Second, it achieves this result without requiring testators or attorneys to modify their behavior. Like any well-drafted sticky default, section 21305 helps testators reap the benefits of a well-calibrated clause even if they continue to employ the same formerly-overbroad no contest language.
In fact, section 21305 appears to have done even more to push the law in the right direction. The wills in our sample reveal that the statute may have made no contest clauses more visible to testators and attorneys. Indeed, after 2001, the following statistically significant changes occurred: (1) fewer testators included a no contest clause, (2) more wills featured a custom-made no contest provision, and (3) even controlling for other variables through a logit regression analysis, 16 . Chin Will, supra note 1, at 2. 17. See id. at 1. 18. See infra notes Part III.B. Of course, it is possible (albeit highly unlikely) that Chin wanted to preclude Gordon from taking even these non-controversial actions.
19 the odds of finding a seemingly gratuitous no contest term declined. These findings support our claim that sticky defaults can serve as an antidote to intentthwarting boilerplate. The Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets the stage by contrasting the issue of stock language in wills within the better-known topic of boilerplate in the commercial setting. Part III provides the background necessary to understand no contest clauses. Part IV details our research methodology and results. Part V concludes.
II BOILERPLATE: FROM CONTRACTS TO WILLS
There is a rich literature on boilerplate in contracts. This Part briefly describes the debate over the efficacy of boilerplate in contracts and explains its relationship to our work on boilerplate in wills.
Scholarship on boilerplate in commercial transactions generally falls into one of two camps. One focuses on business-to-business exchanges. In this realm, "boilerplate"-which is defined as "standard clauses lifted from other agreements on file or in form books" 22 -has both payoffs and drawbacks. On the plus side, a widely-used term can confer both "learning benefits," such as clarity of meaning as a result of judicial interpretation, and "network benefits" of better professional services as lawyers become more familiar with the particular clause. 23 On the flip side, boilerplate can also exhibit "spectacularly, almost ostentatiously, bad drafting." 24 For example, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert E. Scott examined pari passu provisions in sovereign bond contracts and discovered that they contained "black holes": language that has no "recoverable meaning." 25 Choi, Gulati, and Scott traced this glitch to the knee-jerk repetition of a clause despite an absence of judicial rulings construing it. 26 As they explained, "some standardized terms may get used by rote so consistently that they lose a shared meaning and become a ritualized legal incantation." 27 Commentators in the second camp examine boilerplate within "contracts of adhesion": pre-printed, non-negotiable terms that companies foist upon individuals. 28 Discussions in this sphere are fiercely political. In one corner, conservatives and pro-business groups defend boilerplate as a practical necessity. They 22 [t] he contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms"). No. 4 2019] BOILERPLATE NO CONTEST CLAUSES note that the mass-market economy could not function without mass-produced contracts, which save parties the time, energy, and cost of negotiating every deal. 29 Moreover, they claim that harsh terms lower prices and raise wages. 30 In the other corner, liberals and public interest organizations argue that because contracts are supposed to arise from mutual assent, and yet nobody reads the fine print, adhesion "contract" is an oxymoron. 31 In addition, they accuse firms of engaging in private law reform by eliminating background entitlements such as the rights to go to court, to invoke warranties, and to recover consequential damages. 32 Finally, they propose an array of solutions, including disclosures, case-bycase policing under the unconscionability doctrine, and outright bans on specific provisions.
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In Boilerplate and Default Rules, we found that wills suffer from some of the flaws that make standardized contracts so polarizing. For starters, just like the black holes in sovereign debt agreements, several Sussex County documents featured sentences that had decayed into semantic anti-matter. A prime example was terms that governed "representation": the method for allocating assets among multiple generations. 34 About twenty percent of estates tacked language of representation onto gifts to a single beneficiary, a context in which it is a nonsequitur. Another illustration of meaningless boilerplate involves the intersection of the antilapse statute and survival conditions. Antilapse comes into play if a beneficiary dies before the testator. Very roughly, if the predeceased beneficiary is related to the testator, antilapse gives the property to the predeceased beneficiary's descendants. 36 Alternatively, if the predeceased beneficiary is not tied by blood or adoption to the testator, the assets fall into the residue, which is a kind of safety net where residuary beneficiaries take all of the assets that the will has failed to give away. 37 However, testators can override antilapse by using survivorship conditions, such as "to my daughter if she is then living." 38 Inexplicably, a handful of the New Jersey wills imposed survivorship mandates on gifts to nonrelatives. 39 Because antilapse cannot apply to these people, these provisions were linguistic white noise.
In a faint echo of the critique of adhesion contracts, we also discovered that boilerplate in wills tends to oust majoritarian default rules. New Jersey follows the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which calibrates its background principles to "effect[uate] the intent of a decedent." 40 Paradoxically, many of the terms under our microscope opted out of this testator-friendly rubric. Consider the division of estate and inheritance taxes. The Garden State embraces the doctrine of equitable apportionment, which presumes that each beneficiary must pay a proportionate share of the tax bill. 41 The logic here is simple: if A gets 75% of the testator's assets and B receives 25%, it is only fair to charge A with 75% of the tax liability. Nevertheless, 124 wills-roughly half-made the residuary beneficiaries responsible for the entire amount. 42 Because the residuary beneficiaries tend to be a testator's beloved friends and family, these clauses are dubious. In fact, some veteran probate attorneys view them as "malpractice per se."
43 Therefore, wills, like contracts, contain form terms that only appear to bear the testator's stamp of approval.
36. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (West 2019) ("If a devisee who is a grandparent, stepchild or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the decedent is dead at the time of the execution of the governing instrument fails to survive the decedent . . . any descendants of the deceased devisee . . . take by representation in place of the deceased devisee.").
37. See Weisbord & Horton, supra note 10, at 676-77 (noting that antilapse does not apply when the predeceased beneficiary is not related to the testator).
38. Of course, testamentary boilerplate also differs from its contractual cousin. For one, wills do not involve the same risks of unfairness and drafter overreaching. 44 Corporations weaponize consumer and employment contracts, business partners are also adversaries, and "[c]ontract law does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other." 45 Conversely, estate plans are collaborations between attorneys and clients. In fact, lawyers have ethical obligations to ensure that testators know how their property is going to be handled after they die. 46 Thus, intent-perverting boilerplate in wills stems from sloppiness, not opportunism.
Similarly, boilerplate may persist in each type of document for unique reasons. Recall that Choi, Gulati, and Scott attributed black holes in sovereign debt agreements to the interpretive vacuum caused by the lack of any "legal challenges or other methods of validation [to] affirm the meaning of a routinely invoked term." 47 Conversely, analogous provisions in wills are routinely litigated. For example, since at least the 1700s, wills have included "just debts" clauses: short paragraphs at the beginning of the instrument that instruct the executor to "pay all of my just debts as soon as practicable."
48 Indeed, ninety-six percent of the Sussex County instruments featured such a command. 49 These clauses add nothing because executors already must satisfy an estate's creditors. 50 In addition to being superfluous, a just debts term can sow confusion when the testator devises real property that is subject to a mortgage. Under the nonexoneration default, courts presume that the recipient of the land must discharge the loan. 51 But because the executor uses the residue to settle the testator's outstanding obligations, a just debts clause arguably passes the buck to the residuary beneficiaries. 52 Courts have spent decades trying to resolve this dilemma even though they acknowledge that just debts clauses are "legally meaningless."
53 So why do testators cling to this language? As the Supreme Court of Georgia opined, 44 . See Weisbord & Horton, supra note 10, at 675 (noting that unlike in the drafting of some contracts, wills are drafted through a collaborative process involving much input and oversight by the testator).
45 Finally, we believe that the legal system should make the default rules that govern certain low-profile topics stickier. 55 For example, lawmakers and courts could refuse to enforce provisions that shift taxes or mortgage debt to the residue unless the testator added her initials or specifically listed each asset to which this counter-intuitive regime applied. 56 Forcing testators to take this additional measure would disable plain vanilla tax apportionment and just debts provisions and therefore diminish the risk of boilerplate overriding majoritarian default rules. Likewise, the extra labor required to give one's imprimatur to a default-reversing term could capture testators' attention, prompting them to learn more about the topic.
In summary, boilerplate can wreak havoc in both contracts and wills. Indeed, estate plans sometimes contain form terms that the testator probably did not read, or at least did not understand. In the remainder of the Article, we examine one especially troublesome manifestation of this phenomenon: the no contest clause.
III NO CONTEST CLAUSES
This Part offers a primer on no contest clauses. It begins by discussing why these provisions are controversial. It then contextualizes our research by zooming in on California's approach to the topic.
A. "Terror in Probate" 57 A no contest clause usually states that anyone who tries to invalidate a will cannot inherit under it. Testators have included these provisions for centuries. 58 And for nearly as long, the law has struggled to regulate them. 59 No contest clauses stand at the crossroads of powerful, conflicting policies. On the one hand, there are compelling reasons to enforce these provisions. For starters, doing so dovetails with the tradition of honoring donative autonomy. But on the other hand, no contest clauses impede access to the judicial system. This can have pernicious effects. If beneficiaries with legitimate grievances "are forced to remain silent, . . . the court will be prevented by the command of the testator from ascertaining the truth." 67 In turn, this can embolden wrongdoers and undermine society's interest in detecting and punishing anti-social conduct. 63. We say "possibly" for two reasons. First, a beneficiary who succeeds in overturning a will cannot be penalized by a no contest clause in that (now invalid) instrument. Second, as we mention below, a majority of jurisdictions recognize a "probable cause" exception to no contest provisions. Thus, a beneficiary might sue, lose, and still not be penalized.
64 68. See Browder, supra note 5, at 1071 ("It would be easy, for example, for one who fraudulently obtains a share of the testator's estate or secures the same by undue influence to cover his tracks by seeing to it that a clause of forfeiture was added.").
Ironically, one of the first ways that courts tried to balance these concerns was through a primitive sticky default rule. In the seventeenth century, English chancery courts voided no contest provisions unless the testator made a gift over by clarifying what happened to the forfeited property. 69 The gift over doctrine served as a sincerity check. If the testator took this further step, courts "presume [ 70 Conversely, if the testator offered no guidance on what happened to the defaulted share, judges would conclude that she meant the no contest provision to be merely "in terrorem": 71 a nonbinding attempt to "frighten or to caution the beneficiary." 72 In this way, the gift over rule, like all sticky defaults, ignored the plain language of an instrument unless a party jumped through an additional hoop.
Modern American law governing no contest clauses is a cacophony of divergent rules. 73 These approaches run the gamut from flatly invalidating to blindly enforcing no contest provisions. 74 Many states, the UPC, and the Restatement of Property stake out a middle ground by refusing to disinherit any beneficiary who pursues a claim with "probable cause. Even with all this doctrinal instability, perhaps no state has struggled as mightily with no contest clauses as California. In the next subpart, we examine the Golden State's fraught relationship with these terms.
B. No Contest Clauses in California
For much of the twentieth century, California's stance on no contest clauses was impossible to pin down. This Subpart explains how a rash of inconsistent cases prompted lawmakers to experiment with a sticky default rule.
In 1909, the California Supreme Court confronted a no contest provision for the first time in Estate of Hite. 80 John Hite left $5,000 to Etta Gross, the child of an old friend, and the rest of his property largely to his relatives. 81 Hite's will also stated that anyone who contest[ed] it would "receive no part whatever of [the] estate."
82 Hite then executed two codicils, one of which reduced Gross's inheritance to $2,000.
83 Gross challenged this document on the grounds of improper execution, undue influence, and incapacity. 84 After her petition was set for hearing, the matter settled. 85 A residuary beneficiary then argued that Gross had violated the no contest clause. 86 The state high court agreed, reasoning that a contest occurs when a party attempts to "thwart[] . . . the testator's expressed wishes," 87 and that Gross had crossed this line by pursuing her objection on the eve of trial. 92 The other was dated December 25, 1915, and also left Misner more than the will did. 93 Ultimately, the court admitted the August 29 codicil to probate, but Misner abandoned her effort to validate the December 25 instrument, which turned out to be a forgery. 94 Bergland's sons then claimed that Misner had violated the no contest clause in the 1910 will. 95 The California Supreme Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the justices opined that the bogus December 25 codicil did not mention the 1910 will and thus was distinct from the underlying no contest clause. 96 Second, the court declared that "[t]he forfeiture provision has no application to an attempt made in good faith to probate what purports to be a later will." 97 Because there was no evidence that Misner had acted with malice, the justices held that she did not need to surrender her inheritance.
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The conflict between Hite and Bergland was stark. Both beneficiaries had done similar things-Gross had objected to a valid codicil and Misner had tried to probate an invalid codicil-but only Gross had been penalized. Considering the language of each no contest clause made things even hazier. If anything, the provision in Hite was narrower than the one in Bergland. Indeed, the former merely prohibited contests, 99 As the decades passed, the outcome of no contest litigation in California continued to be "difficult to predict."
104 Two rough lines of authority emerged. One ignored Bergland or limited it to its facts. 105 For example, in Estate of Howard, an appellate panel disinherited the testator's husband for asserting that part of the estate was his community property. 106 The testator had used an estate planning technique known as the spousal election, which entailed leaving her husband a generous gift, inserting a no contest clause that covered challenges to the will's provisions, declaring that certain assets were her separate property, and devising these assets to other people. 107 As the court recognized, this maneuver gave the husband a choice: he could "either rely upon his claim of ownership and waive his rights under the will, or accept the provisions of the will and waive his rights of ownership."
108 Because he went down the former path, he had violated the no contest clause's admonition not to attack the will's provisions. 109 101. See id. at 278-80 ("The attempt to probate a later will cannot be said to be an objection to the distribution made by the first will.").
102. and remove an executor. 117 As commentators noted, these divergent outcomes revealed that "California courts had yet to develop a . . . coherent approach for interpreting no contest clauses."
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This doctrinal turmoil came to a head near the dawn of the new millennium. In 1990, the California Law Revision Commission published a report voicing concern that "a beneficiary cannot predict with any consistency when an activity will be held to fall within the proscription of a particular no contest clause." 119 The legislature responded by passing Probate Code section 21304, which declared that "a no contest clause shall be strictly construed."
120 By borrowing the "strictly construed" language from Bergland, lawmakers seemed to repudiate cases like Hite and Howard. 124 After Frank died, Marlene sought declaratory relief that she could file two lawsuits without being disinherited: one for conversion against the trustees and another under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act against the administrators of the pension plan. 125 The court held that these petitions would unravel the spousal election, which was the cornerstone of Frank's "integrated estate plan."
126 Thus, because the lawsuits "were 'designed to thwart [Frank's] basic intent,'" they would violate the no contest clause.
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Shortly after Burch, legislators pushed back. Complaining that courts had read "generic 'no contest' clauses" too broadly and thus "introduced an unnecessary level of uncertainty and ultimately litigation into this area," they adopted Probate Code section 21305. 128 This sticky default rule presumes that no contest clauses do not apply in certain situations unless the testator expressly dictates otherwise:
[T]he following actions do not constitute a contest unless expressly identified in the no contest clause as a violation of the clause:
(1) The filing of a creditor's claim or prosecution of an action based upon it.
(2) An action or proceeding to determine the character, title, or ownership of property. Section 21305 revolutionized California's approach to no contest provisions. Consider how the statute would have changed several seminal cases. For example, recall that Hite held that a challenge to the validity of a codicil violated a provision in the underlying will that disinherited beneficiaries for filing a contest. 130 Yet if the testator had executed his will after January 1, 2001, the result would have been different. In the language of section 21305, the beneficiary targeted "an instrument" -the codicil-"other than the instrument containing the no contest clause"-the will-and the testator did not "expressly identif[y]" such a petition "in the no contest clause as a violation of the clause." Likewise, under the new law, the beneficiaries in Howard and Burch could have freely pursued their community property rights.
131 After all, they filed "proceeding[s] to determine the character, title, or ownership of property," and the no contest provisions were silent about those claims. Thus, section 21305 forced any testator who truly wanted a no contest provision to stretch to the horizon to say so explicitly.
IV EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
This Part capitalizes on an originally-collected dataset to examine boilerplate no contest clauses and the efficacy of sticky default rules. It begins by briefly describing our research methodology. It then presents and analyzes our results.
A. Data Description
One of us has written several articles based on probate administrations from Alameda County, California. Some of these papers feature a fine-grained dataset of fifty variables stemming from 668 estates that both (1) came on calendar between January 1, 2008 and March 1, 2009 and (2) stemmed from deaths in 2007 (the "original" sample).
132 Others involve at least ten data points from (1) every case in the original sample and (2) all matters that the court heard between March 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010 (a "combined" sample of 2,453 observations).
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For this Article, we expanded both the original sample and a sliver of the combined sample. First, we enlarged the scope of the detail-rich original sample to include cases that appeared on the docket in March and April 2009. Second, we read and coded each will in this dataset, with an eye toward (1) determining what kind, if any, of no contest clause was included in the will, (2) whether the testator was married when the will was executed, (3) whether a will was self- 135. There are 457 wills in our dataset. Because we are focusing on the impact of California law, we eliminated two instruments that were executed in other states. We also cut thirteen other wills that litigants challenged as invalid in a case that either went to trial or settled. We did so in an effort to balance two countervailing factors. On the one hand, if a will is contested, it is not clear that it truly represents the testator's intent. But on the other hand, excluding all challenged wills would risk underreporting the number of no contest provisions, because testators who anticipate trouble may be especially likely to include such a clause. We therefore decided to use the fact that a contest survived until the trial or settlement stage as a sign a will might not be legitimate and thus should be cut from our sample. Finally, one will lacks a date, and two wills are missing the page that contains most of the no contest provision. As the reader can see below, we include these three documents for some purposes, but not others.
136. In sharp contrast, only 20 of the 244 (8.2%) wills in our New Jersey study included no contest clauses. This gulf is puzzling. In fact, in one way, it is the opposite of what one might expect. Unlike California, where the law has never been settled, New Jersey has long refused to enforce no contest clauses against petitions filed with "probable cause." Haynes v. First Nat. Third, a handful of clauses are "very broad." These provisions penalize beneficiaries for conduct beyond merely filing a lawsuit. Consider Lillie Brooks's will, which is a veritable minefield for its beneficiaries:
If any devisee, legatee or beneficiary under this Will, or any other person claiming under or through any devisee, legatee or beneficiary . . . shall in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, contest this Will or attack, oppose or in any manner seek to impair or invalidate any provision thereof, or shall in any manner whatsoever conspire or cooperate with any person or persons attempting to do any of the acts or things aforesaid, or shall acquiesce in or fail to oppose such proceedings, then . . . I hereby bequeath to such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR . . . .
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This language is more potent than a broad clause because it activates if a beneficiary simply sits on the sidelines and fails to resist another party's lawsuit. Very broad provisions surface in twenty-six (5.9%) wills.
Fourth, some testators use "quasi-sophisticated" clauses. The hallmark of such a provision is its granularity: it expressly mentions the impact of either filing a particular claim or challenging an instrument other than the will. For instance, quasi-sophisticated clauses might make "the seeking of declaratory relief . . . equivalent to contesting the will" 140 or govern attempts to invalidate the testator's pension, revocable inter vivos trust, or life insurance beneficiary designations. Twenty-seven (6.2%) clauses offered this much detail.
Fifth, no contest provisions can be full-on "sophisticated." A sophisticated clause either spells out the consequences of bringing more than one kind of lawsuit or addresses multiple non-probate devices. In fact, most sophisticated clauses-like the one reproduced below-are so verbose that they meet both criteria:
If any person, directly or indirectly, contests the validity of this will in whole or in part, or opposes, objects to, or seeks to invalidate any of its provisions, or the validity of any contract, agreement (including any trust agreement), declaration of trust, beneficiary designation, or other document executed by me (or for my benefit) that is part of my integrated estate plan . . . any gift or other interest given to that person under this will shall be revoked . . . . I specifically exempt petitions under California Probate Code sections 9860, 17200 or 17200.1 from the effect of this clause.
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Ten (2.3%) sophisticated provisions popped up in our data, which is reproduced in full in the chart below. 
No Contest Clauses as Intent-Defeating Boilerplate
This Subpart argues that some of the no contest clauses in the Alameda County wills are boilerplate that distort the probable wishes of the testator. First, we show that drafters frequently copy these terms from other sources. Second, we contend that the risks of these provisions often outweigh the benefits.
At the outset, there are reasons to suspect that many no contest clauses are boilerplate. For starters, judges, scholars, and practitioners refer to them as such. 142 Moreover, form books have featured readymade no contest provisions for decades, 143 and "some attorneys believe it is malpractice not to include such a clause." 144 In some cases, lawyers have admitted inserting no contest language on their "own initiative" without "receiv[ing] explicit instructions" from a client. 145 Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that the vast majority of the no contest clauses in our sample appear to be recycled. For example, broad clauses, which account for nearly three-quarters of the no contest provisions in our data, tend to be carbon copies of each other. They invariably consist of a single sentence that deletes the share of anyone who in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks the will or any of its provisions. 146 This precise phraseology has appeared in California drafting manuals for more than half a century; 147 in fact, commentators refer to it as the "generic 'no contest' clause." 148 There can be little question that this language is borrowed from templates or prior instruments.
However, this does not prove that no contest clauses are problematic. Even if drafters mindlessly regurgitate a provision, testators might notice it when they read their wills. In fact, no contest clauses are more conspicuous than the arcane terms we studied in Boilerplate and Default Rules. That article plumbed the depths of estate planning by surveying language that allocated responsibility for paying debts and taxes 149 -topics that testators might gloss over. Conversely, no contest clauses, which govern the operatic mix of litigation and disinheritance, likely stand out. Thus, whether no contest provisions are bespoke or borrowed, testators are probably aware of them.
Moreover, not all boilerplate is inconsistent with a testator's informed wishes. Arguably, no contest clauses are majoritarian. After all, nobody wants their estate to get bogged down in the judicial system. Perhaps the law is backwards, and suing should disqualify a beneficiary from receiving any of a decedent's bounty unless the will includes a contest authorization clause that states otherwise.
We uncovered support for this proposition in a surprising place: holographic wills. 150 One would not expect to find any legalese in these self-made instruments. But six of the thirty-seven (16.2%) holographs in our data boasted a no contest clause. Herbert Rodgers's will, pictured in Figure 1 below, is illustrative. It names an executor, lists assets, distributes them, and declares in the underlined portion: "If anyone file[s] claims to my estate, give them One Dollar."
151 Likewise, other do-it-yourselfers expressed the same sentiment even if they did not translate it into a legal imperative. For example, Hannah Wit wrote a will in her diary and tossed in a dash of spice: "Anyone who doesn't believe that I am of 'sound mind' right now, writing this, is wrong. Anyone who contests this on the basis of some legal mumbo jumbo, I will have you know, I am rolling over in my grave now."
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The existence of no contest terminology in these direct dispatches from the testator-the antithesis of boilerplate-highlights the intuitive desire to discourage litigation. provisions remain common because they telegraph that the testator is an upstanding and responsible citizen. 153 In the same vein, no contest clauses may be popular because they send a message. 154 Perhaps testators like the way a no contest clause reinforces their commitment to their dispositive choices, like adding an exclamation point at the end of a sentence. In turn, this would raise questions about whether testators fully grasp what they are doing when they insert or approve such a provision.
Indeed, on closer inspection, some no contest clauses deviate from a testator's likely intent. Of course, because we did not interview the decedents who populate the Alameda County files, we can only guess about what they wanted to accomplish. 155 Yet there are some telltale signs that the testators and their attorneys misunderstood the no contest mechanism. For example, of the fifty-five wills expressly disinherit an individual, and forty (73%) of them contain a no contest clause. Occasionally, the language excluding the person appears in the same paragraph as the no contest provision. Consider Jesse Naputi's will, which leaves his daughter nothing:
Fifth. I have intentionally omitted to provide for Jennifer Ortega, who shall be deemed to have predeceased me with no issue. If any person . . . for any reason or in any matter, directly or indirectly, contests the validity of this Will in whole or in part, on any ground, or opposes or objects to any of the provisions of the Will . . . the contesting person shall not take anything from my estate.
156
The proximity of these two terms implies that the testator meant to discourage the snubbed relative from suing. 157 But the no contest clause fails to achieve this goal. To work, such a provision needs not only a stick, but also a carrot. Indeed, it must give the potential troublemaker enough to make her think twice before lawyering up. In contrast, a non-beneficiary like Naputi's daughter literally has nothing to lose. These unartful wills suggest that testators and their counsel do not always have a solid grasp of how no contest provisions operate.
Likewise, no contest clauses were common even in cases where beneficiaries were extremely unlikely to sue. Putting aside seventy-two pour over wills which give property to a trust and thus do not reveal the estate's true beneficiaries, 192 testators distributed property in a fashion that closely approximated California's intestacy scheme. 158 However, 122 (63.5%) of them included a no contest provision. 159 This prophylactic measure seems like overkill in these "all to my spouse" or "to my children equally" wills, which usually sail smoothly through the probate process. Indeed, just nine (4.7%) of these estates became embroiled in litigation, compared to twenty-three (12.4%) of the other 185 matters, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
160 Even more to the point, when intestacy-mirroring wills generated a dispute, it was usually initiated by a non-beneficiary who could not have been deterred by a no contest clause. 161 Therefore, the no contest provisions in these wills were largely superfluous.
At the same time, these clauses had the potential to warp a testator's plans. For one, they could erase the inheritance of a close friend or relation in situations where the testator would have preferred not to inflict such a draconian penalty. Recall that Hite and Burch held that a no contest clause applied to any action that thwarted a testator's intent. 162 Thus, although the law was hopelessly tangled, a beneficiary gambled with her inheritance if she tried to remove an executor, 163 object to an accounting, 164 question whether property belonged to the estate, 165 158. Because we do not have access to these trusts, we cannot determine whom they ultimately benefit, and therefore we cannot analyze whether the testator followed or deviated from intestacy. Mark Glover's thoughtful response to Boilerplate in Default Rules (in which we also excluded pour over wills from our analysis) raises the issue of whether pour over wills are as likely as conventional wills to contain boilerplate. See Mark Glover, Boilerplate in Pour-over Wills, 103 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 138, 146 (2018).
As a result, we should report that 58 of 72 (80.6%) pour over wills contained a no contest clause, compared to only 248 of 370 (67.0%) conventional wills, which is a statistically significant difference (p < 0.05). Otherwise, the actual no contest provisions in pour over wills broke down similarly to their traditional counterparts: 37 (51.4%) were broad, 13 (18.0%) were quasi-sophisticated, 3 (3.9%) were sophisticated, 3 (3.9%) were narrow, and 2 (2.8%) were very broad. The relatively high number of quasi-sophisticated provisions reflects the fact that no contest clauses in pour over wills often cover challenges to the trust into which the will "pours," and our definition of quasi-sophisticated includes attacks on an instrument other than the will.
159. Admittedly, this is a slightly lower percentage of no contest saturation than the wills that deviated from intestacy (126 of 178, or 70.8%).
160. The calculations in this paragraph include the thirteen wills that faced serious validity challenges, which we excluded for the purposes of counting and classifying no contest provisions. Cf. supra text accompanying note 135. We plugged these instruments into the equation here because we needed to gauge the relationship between a testator's decision to break from the intestacy mold and the incidence of litigation.
161. Learly Saunders's estate is pretty typical. A few of Saunders's grandchildren petitioned to open the case as an intestacy. However, the Public Administrator then successfully moved to admit a will that disinherited them. See Case Summary at 1, In re Estate of Saunders, No. RP07312533 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2007). Thus, although the case involved litigation, neither the omitted grandchildren nor the Public Administrator would have been subject to a no contest clause in Saunders's will.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88, 121-27; see also In re Kitchen, 220 P. 301, 303 (Cal. 1923) (construing an especially capacious no contest clause to "penalize the commencement of any suit whatever").
163. Cf. Estate of Ferber, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774, 780 (Ct. App. 1998) (opining that an exceptionally broad no contest clause that governed "challenges [to] the appointment of any person named as an executor" did not violate public policy as applied to frivolous objections).
164. Cf. id. (holding that the same extremely broad "no contest clause was valid insofar as it prohibited frivolous objections to the accounting, but otherwise was invalid").
165. See Estate of Kazian, 130 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that beneficiary's attempt to re-characterize assets in the estate as community property "was a proceeding intended to thwart the [Vol. 82:69 or probate a subsequent will that turned out to be invalid. 166 It is doubtful that every testator who included a no contest clause meant to wield so heavy a hammer.
In addition, a no contest clause could saddle a beneficiary with hefty costs even if it almost certainly did not govern a particular filing. As the California Law Revision Commission observed in 2007, malpractice-wary lawyers insisted on obtaining declaratory relief from a court that a no contest provision did not apply before doing anything that could possibly violate the provision:
Prudent practitioners now routinely file petitions for declaratory relief under Probate Code § 21320. Californians now expect to have two levels of litigation when instruments contain a no contest clause: file a Probate Code § 21320 petition and litigate the declaratory relief, and then litigate the substantive issues in another, separate proceeding. 167 According to the Executive Committee of the Trusts and Estates Section of the California Bar, this initial round of motion practice cost beneficiaries between $1,500 and $5,000 in 20% of cases, $5,000 and $20,000 in 40% of cases, $20,000 and $50,000 in 30% of cases, and $50,000 to $100,000 in 10% of cases. 168 Thus, no contest clauses could work hardships that most testators probably did not foresee. 169 Two cases from our dataset illustrate how a no contest clause can become an electric third rail that beneficiaries go out of their way to avoid. First, in 1983, Carrie Troupe executed a will that contained a broad no contest clause that applied to "contests or attacks [on] this Will or any of its provisions."
170 After she passed away, two beneficiaries accused the executor of serious wrongdoing, including conversion and elder abuse.
171 Although these allegations did not seem decedent's wishes as expressed in her will to which the no-contest clause contained in that will properly applied"); see also Estate of Pittman, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 628 (Ct. App. 1998) (same result where no contest provision appeared in trust that "meticulously set forth pieces of property to be included in the trust estate and characterized each piece of property as community property" like assaults on the will, the beneficiaries felt compelled to obtain declaratory relief before moving forward with their lawsuit. 172 Second, an inventor and philanthropist named Kenneth Rainin died in 2007, leaving an estate worth roughly $600,000,000. 173 Rainin's trusts made charitable gifts, named his daughter Jennifer beneficiary and co-trustee, and also left a substantial sum to his son, Jesse.
174 Rainin had also executed a pour over will that contained an expansive no contest clause:
Actions constituting a violation of this paragraph shall include, but shall not be limited to, (1) the filing of a creditor's claim or prosecution of an action based upon it, (2) an action or proceeding to determine the character of property, (3) a challenge to the validity of an instrument, contract, agreement, beneficiary designation or other document relating to my estate plan, and (4) a petition for settlement or for compromise affecting the terms of this Will or any trust . . . . 175 Unfortunately, several things went sideways during the administration of his estate. For one, Rainin apparently never transferred a huge chunk of his assets to the trust when he was alive, which meant that they needed to pass through probate under the pour over will. Even worse, the trust seemed to make Jesse responsible for paying the entire estate tax bill of more than $50,000,000. 176 The attorney who had drafted the trust and all the parties agreed that this was a scrivener's error. 177 Yet before Jennifer and her co-trustee could try to reform the trust, they needed to devote 180 pages of briefing, declarations, and exhibits to explaining why filing such a petition would not violate the no contest clause in the pour over will. 178 Therefore, the threat of disinheritance can cause some beneficiaries to seek declaratory relief before doing just about anything related to the testator's estate plan.
In sum, boilerplate no contest clauses can frustrate a testator's intent. How can policymakers increase awareness of these terms? Our next subpart evaluates one potential answer to that question.
Sticky Defaults
As we mentioned above, in the late 1990s, California lawmakers became concerned that courts had opened the door for "generic 'no contest' clauses" to govern a wide range of filings. 179 In 2001, the legislature addressed this problem by adopting Probate Code section 21305. 180 This statute required any testator who wanted a no contest clause to apply to creditor's claims, petitions to re-characterize property, and challenges to other instruments to say so on the face of the will. 181 As such, it is a classic example of the sticky default rules we urged lawmakers to adopt in Boilerplate and Default Rules. But was it effective? This Subpart reveals that the answer is a qualified yes. Although section 21305 was no miracle cure, wills executed after it came online were less likely to contain a problematic no contest clause.
Comparing pre-2001 wills with their post-2001 counterparts suggests that section 21305 made testators more aware of no contest provisions. First, after the statute became operational, the percentage of wills without a no contest clause increased from 25.7% to 35.0%, a statistically significant margin (p < 0.05). One could infer that the new law's specificity requirements forced estate planners to discuss no contest clauses in greater depth, which prompted more clients to decide not to include such a provision.
Second, the percentage of wills with broad no contest provisions fell from 56.8% to 45.3%, which is also statistically significant (p < 0.05). As we noted above, we are especially skeptical of broad clauses, which almost always appear to be lifted wholesale from other sources.
Third, the percentage of wills with sophisticated no contest clauses rose from less than 1.0% to 4.0%. Although this was not a colossal change, it was statistically meaningful (p < 0.05). In addition, the post-2001 sophisticated clauses were highly individualized. For example, some included petitions to determine title to property, 182 but others excluded them. 183 Likewise, testators made their wishes known with respect to disclaimers, 184 requests for declaratory relief, 185 claims of common law marriage, 186 actions for "a community property set aside, constructive trust, quiet title . . . or contract to make a will," 187 and "challenge[s] to the validity of an instrument, contract, or agreement, beneficiary designation, or other document related to my estate plan." 188 This customized language is a far cry from the rote repetition of boilerplate. Fourth, the percentage of wills that contained seemingly unnecessary no contest clauses fell sharply after section 21305 kicked in. As noted above, we are distrustful of no contest provisions in wills that roughly track the intestacy statute. 189 For ease of reference, we will call these "suspected boilerplate" no contest clauses. Before 2001, 43.4% of wills in our sample contained suspected boilerplate no contest provisions; afterwards, this figure dropped to just 20.8% (p < 0.001). Of course, this might be nothing more than a shadow cast by the fact that the total number of no contest clauses also declined. Thus, to slice the data another way, we also examined whether the percentage of suspected boilerplate provisions also changed in the narrower universe of wills that contain no contest clauses. We found that suspected boilerplate accounted for 59.8% of all no contest provisions before section 21305, but just 33.9% afterwards (p < 0.001). Finally, a logit regression also suggests that the new statute was correlated with a drop in unnecessary no contest clauses. We used the existence of a suspected boilerplate no contest clause as our dependent variable. Our independent variables included whether a case was filed in Oakland versus the other Alameda County courthouses that handled probate matters during this time, the testator's gender, whether the testator was married when she executed the will, whether the testator was married when she died, the gross value of the estate, the gross value of the estate's real property, whether the will contains a just debts clause, and whether the will was drafted by the testator herself. 190 As Table 4 reveals, the odds of a will containing a boilerplate no contest clause are 57.2% lower after the statute's enactment. Likewise, in the sample of wills with no contest provisions, the odds that a will's no contest clause would be boilerplate fell by 61.6%. 190. There are four kinds of self-made wills in our sample: holographs, documents that the testator either handwrote or typed herself and then had witnessed, fill-in-the-blank forms, and instruments created through software sold by Nolo Press or LegalZoom.
191
191. In the sample of all wills, the logit coefficient for the "Will Executed after 2001" variable is statistically significant (p = 0.001) and the odds ratio is 0.428, which suggests that the odds of a will containing a boilerplate no contest clause are 57.2% lower (1 -0.428 = 0.572) after the statute's enactment. In the sample of wills with no contest provisions, the logit coefficient on "Will Executed after 2001" is statistically significant (p < 0.001) and the odds ratio is 0.355, which implies that the odds that a will's no contest clause would be boilerplate fell by 64.5% (1 -0.355 = 0.645).
A few other variables were also correlated in a statistically significant fashion with the odds of finding a boilerplate no contest provision. First, estates filed in Oakland were less likely to include such a provision in both the larger sample of all wills and the subsample of wills that contain no contest clauses. We are unsure why this might be. Second, the fact that the testator was married when she executed the will made it more likely that a will would contain a boilerplate no contest provision in both samples. Our best guess is that this reflects the fact that married testators generally give their entire estate to their spouse and thus are less likely to sharply deviate from intestacy. In turn, this means that married testators' no contest clauses are probably going to be "suspected boilerplate" as we define it. Third, the odds are lower that a self-made will features a boilerplate no contest clause. This makes sense, because holographs and their ilk usually do not feature no contest clauses, period. But cf. supra text accompanying notes 150-52. Somewhat paradoxically, in the sample of wills that contain no contest clauses, the fact that a will is self-drafted increases the odds of finding a boilerplate no contest provision. As with married testators, we think the culprit is that self-made wills tend to follow intestacy; thus, any no contest clause in a do-ityourself instrument is going to be "suspected boilerplate" (or, more accurately, "generally unnecessary"). Notes:
The regression sample sizes are smaller than the overall samples because some cases are missing data. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Admittedly, our research also reveals some downsides of sticky default rules. One critique of magic words mandates like section 21305 is that instead of sparking discussion between lawyers and clients, they simply breed new boilerplate that bears the magic words. 192 There are some glimmers of this phenomenon in 192 . See Weisbord & Horton, supra note 10, at 706 ("Sticky defaults also increase the risk of ambiguity about a testator's desires."). Boilerplate in wills is a complex phenomenon. It is quick and cheap to insert, and it can ride the wake of multiple judicial opinions that clarify its meaning. But form terms can also become so routine that lawyers forget to ask whether they suit a client's needs. No contest clauses in Alameda County seem to have acquired this perverse momentum: they appear in a super-majority of wills even though their costs often seem to outweigh their benefits.
Although there is no magic bullet solution to intent-defeating boilerplate, sticky default rules have two advantages. First, by making it hard for testators to opt out, they insulate favorable default rules from the careless use of stock language. Indeed, under a sticky default, boilerplate that once displaced a majoritarian principle no longer suffices, meaning that fewer testators will have their intent thwarted. Second, as our research implies, sticky defaults can shine light on previously non-salient terms. By demanding extra time and attention during the drafting process, sticky defaults can foster discussions between lawyers and clients and encourage thoughtful estate planning. Accordingly, sticky defaults can help reverse the harm caused by intent-defeating boilerplate, especially in the area of no contest clauses.
